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Inequality and Growth: A Preamble1 
Kaushik Basu, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Vivian Hon 
It was a part of the common wisdom of mainstream economics that, for devel-
oping countries, in the early stages of development, inequality would rise but, as 
growth persisted, inequality would, eventually, decline. Evidence gathered over 
the first three decades after World War II, seemed to suggest that this pattern 
would be borne out. But, as more time passed and growth persisted1 inequality, 
as measured on several dimensions, has continued to grow. What this illus-
trates is the folly of trying to determine long-run future trends by extrapolating 
from a couple of decades of data. Looking at the past is an uncertaln guide for 
the future: the innovations created at each stage of history may or may not 
make the next fundamentally different from those of the past. To peer into the 
future, we will not only need data but also analysis and theory. Our aim in 
this volume is more modest than peering into the distant future; but rather, to 
analyze the current state of global and regional inequality, to dissect the phe-
nomenal increase in inequality that we have seen occur in recent times, and 
to better understand the relationship between inequality and development. 
But taking a cue from what was argued above, we have been mindful to bring 
analysis· and economic theory to bear on data and statistics. This was one of 
the driving forces behind the conceptualization of this monograph, which 
eventually grew to being a two-volume set. But there were other driving forces. 
As the world has continued to grow, the persistence of extreme poverty and 
the growing gap in the incomes and wellbeing between the world's poorest 
and the richest people have become unconscionably high. As is argued in one 
of the chapters, there is growing evidence that there is not just a glass ceiling 
for the very poor but a glass floor for those who are born very rich. That is, 
it is difficult for them to become poor. We should care not only about the 
average growth rates within the economy, but also about how those num-
bers translate into opportunities for individuals - all individuals, both those 
born to the rich and to the poor. The long-run relationship between growth 
and inequality is important to study but we also have to try to understand 
the contemporary patterns and regularities, including those relating income 
inequalities and inequalities of opportunity. And as we acquire better knowl-
edge of these, we have to ask ourselves what are the accompanying policy 
challenges for growth that is not just rapid but also inclusive and sustalnable, 
which_ is nothing but inclusive over tiJne. Growth that benefits the current 
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generation at the expense of future generations is not, in a fundamental 
sense, inclusive. 
It is possible that the growing income and welfare gaps are contributing to 
the growing political turmoil we see around the world, from the Arab Spring 
and growing refugee crisis to the Occupy movement. Each one of these devel-
opments has distinct proximate causes, but it is arguable that underlying them 
there is a deeper cause rooted in the sense of despair and deep feelings of injus-
tice and inequity,and the inability to exercise voice through normal political 
processes for a mass of people who have felt their relative positions deteriorate. 
Extreme inequality not only deprives masses from sharing the benefits of eco-
nomic development but by robbing the disadvantaged of voice, it also has a 
propensity to erode democracy. 
Fortunately, as the challenge of inequality and marginalization has grown, 
several new books and writings have appeared, from Stiglitz (2012), Galbraith 
(2012), Piketty (2014), through Milanovic (2014) and Bourguignon (2015), to most 
recently, Atkinson (2015). Of late, this is a topic in which there has also been 
welcome engagement both fro1n unlikely institutions Sl1;Ch as the International 
Monetary Fund (Berg and Ostry, 2011) and the OECD (2014) and from 
less-surprising ones, such as Oxfam (2015). 
In 2013, the World Bank Group officially declared two mission goals for itself-
the end of chronic, extreme poverty by 2030 and the promotion of shared 
prosperity in every society, the latter being defined (for the purpose of statisti-
cal computation) as the promotion of growth of the per capita real income of 
the poorest 40 percent of each society.2 Implicit in this was the mission to help 
the poorest segment of society to grow faster than the rest, thereby mitigating 
inequality. This was the first time that the Bank set the curbing of inequality 
as a mission goal. 3 
The importance of a focus on inequality stems from the fact that the bulk of 
inequality is not a matter of individual choice - some people preferring leisure 
to work and so choosing to be poor. Indeed, the bulk of human inequality is 
determined by birth--by what a child inherits and the kind of schooling, educa-
tion1 and health care the child receives. Since there are no hardworking babies, 
this inequality cannot be driven by individual preferences over leisure and work. 
Once it is agreed that the right direction to go from where we stand today 
is to strive to mitigate poverty and inequality, attention must tum to the driv-
ers of poverty and inequality. This is where the relation between growth and 
inequality becomes significant. Growth is of course very important, especially 
for low-income countries and emerging economies. It is not possible for such 
countries to have significant across-the-board reductions in poverty 'Without 
growth. But growth does not necessarily lead to the reduction of poverty. 
More broadly, what does growth mean for the reduction in inequality, apd 
what does inequality do for growth? These questions have led to a contentious 
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debate. There is an emerging consensus that inequality is bad for growth; and 
this is an idea that the reader will encounter in this two-volume book. 
Some believers in "growth alone" (the view that the World Bank and other 
development agencies should focus just on growth) argue that growth will 
trickle down to the poor, unmindful of the fact that the word "trickle" itself 
gives away the hand of these commentators. This has been a contentious area 
of debate with a plethora of fallacies and misstatements. Consider, for instance, 
the finding, based on the study of large data sets, that over three quarters of 
poverty mitigation in recent decades can be attributed to plain and simple 
economic growth. From this, some people have deduced that growth therefore 
is the best cure for poverty and that we simply need to press on the growth 
accelerator and poverty will be taken care of.4 
This, however, turns out to be a classic case of faulty deduction from arguably 
correct data. The fact that the bulk of the poverty eradicated in recent decades 
was because of growth does not mean growth is the best cure for poverty. All 
depends on what else was tried. If hardly any other relevant policies were tried, 
whatever poverty is eradicated would be because of growth, but that says little. 
It is like a Soviet economist studying job creation in the USSR in the 60s, 70s 
and 80s, and concluding that the government is the best creator of jobs, siuce 
almost all jobs were created by the state. 
Indeed, even if growth by itself led to poverty reduction, given our poor 
record of eradicating poverty- in 2011, 14.5 percent of the world population lived 
below the poverty line of 1.25 dollars, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-adjusted),s 
per day - there is clearly a need to do much more and to look for appropriate 
policy interventions that go beyond "just" promoting growth. 
This two-volume collection, Inequality and Growth: Patterns and Policy, is an 
effort to assemble the best of contemporary thinking on the subject. It is based 
on a roundtable convened by the International Economic Association (!EA) 
and the World Bank on "Shared Prosperity and Growth," and organized as 
part of the !EA 17th World Congress held at Dead Sea, Jordan, on June 10-11, 
2014. In the roundtable that we organized, we tried to assemble an outstanding 
group of scholars, many of whom have grappled with the issues for many 
years, and from various perspectives. 
The topics include conceptual issues and measurements, the state of gl0bal 
inequality, regional experiences, inequality of opportunity, consequences of 
inequality, and also some special areas that go beyond the traditionai inequal-
ity discourse. The insights generated at the roundtable are critical in policy 
debates on economic development. The collection includes a total of sixteen 
full-length papers, and fifteen commentaries on those papers.6 
The first volume, Concepts and Analysis, is a collection of papers on the con-
ceptual and theoretical issues on inequality and its measurements. In chapter 1 
of this volume entitled 11 New Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of 
Income and Wealth Among Individuals," Joseph Stiglitz lays out five new styl-
ized facts. First, there is growing inequality in both wages and capital income 
(wealth) and growing inequality overall. Second, wealth is more unequally dis-
tributed than wages. Third, average wages have stagnated, even as productivity 
has increased, and so the share of capital has increased. Fourth, there have been 
significant increases in the wealth-income ratio, and last, the return to capital 
has not declined, even as the wealth-income ratio has increased. 
Section 1 of this chapter provides an overview of the key anomalies presented 
by the new stylized facts. It explains why they are inconsistent with the standard 
neoclassical models long used by economists, and explains how a focus on rents 
(ignored in the standard neoclassical models) helps to resolve the inconsisten-
cies. It explains the central confusion between 11wealth11 as a measure of control 
over resources and "capital" (or more broadly1 an aggregate measure of produc-
tive capital), and shows that the former can be increasing while the latter is 
decreasing (at least relative to income or effective labor supply). Land values can 
increase, but the productive capacities of the economy decrease. An.increase in 
wealth as a result of exploitation (monopoly) rents can even result in a decrease 
in productive capacities as measured wealth increases. For instance, savings data 
from the National Income Accounts for the United States account for only a frac-
tion of the observed increase in wealth; the rest is associated with an increased 
in the capitalized value of rents. Section 2 of the first chapter re-examines the 
equilibrium wealth distribution within the context of a standard neoclassical 
model of growth without land, showing that (contrary to Piketty's assertions) 
there is not ever increasing wealth and inco1ne inequality. Equilibrium inequal-
ity is related to underlying behavioral and technology parameters. Section 3 
introduces land and rents into the model, analyzes the long-run determinants 
of land rents and the price of land, and explains how the credit system plays an 
important role in both the increase in the wealth-income ratio and the increase 
in wealth inequality. The chapter explains that in designing policies to mitigate 
inequality, one has to be sensitive to the possibillty of tax shifting, but shows 
how capital taxes with revenues devoted to investment as well as land taxes can 
lead to reduced inequality and higher steady-state income levels. 
In the chapter "Reflections on the 'Equity and Development': World Development 
Report Ten Years Later," Francois Bourguignon refiects on the 2006 World 
Development Report (WDR). While the report represented a major step forward 
in the Bank's broadening its focus beyond poverty and growth as the main 
poverty reduction tool, it fell short in putting the issues of inequality front and 
center stage. Besides political considerations1 this choice was dictated by the 
recognition that the analytical link between inequality and development was 
more complex than a direct negative impact of income inequality on growth. 
Instead, the report focused on the inequality of opportunities as the major 
direct impediment to development and the ways of reducing it by "leveling the 
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playing field", including among other measures of income redistribution. The 
increased attention to inequality of opportunity was a significant contribution 
to the development policy debate. 
Ravi Kanbur and Adam Wagstaff's chapter, "How Useful is Inequality of 
Opportunity as a Policy Construct?" acknowledges that the empirical analysis 
of equality of opportunity has contributed significantly to our understanding 
of the determinants of inequality of outcomes and have become an important 
part of the analysis of policy. At the same time, as the authors point out, there 
are limitations, both conceptual and empirical, of the practical usefulness of 
the concept for policymaking. Drawing on applications in the education and 
health sector1 they argue, as Francois Bourguignon does in the previous chap-
ter, that the focus on inequality of opportunity is often used to delegitimize 
concerns over inequality <of outcomes, including those arising fron1 luck, risk 
and the distribution of talent (which is also luck, one step removed). 
In "The Effects of Fiscal Redistribution," Michele Battisti and Joseph Zeira use 
cross-country, pooled, and panel regressions to examine the role of fiscal policy 
in reducing income inequality. They test for the possibility of any reverse cau-
sality, namely that public spending increase is driven by pressure to redistribute 
and which type of fiscal policy is most strongly related to the redistribution 
of income. They find that a one percent increase in public expenditui:e as a 
percent of GDP reduces income inequality in both cross-country and pooled 
regressions by 0.3-0.4 percent. Fiscal policy is also significant in reducing pov-
erty, in particular labor market subsidies. Due to data constraints, their analysis 
on poverty is limited to OECD countries. 
The papers by Hai-Anh Dang and Peter Lanjouw, Tony Castleman, James 
Foster and Stephen Smith, and by John Ifcher and Homa Zarghamee propose 
alternative ways of conceptualizing and measuring inequality, poverty and vul-
nerability. The simplicity of poverty headcount measures have made them the 
most widely used measure for monitoring poverty. However, in tl1eir chapter, 
/(Person Equivalent Headcount Measures of Poverty, 11 Tony Castleman, James 
Foster and Stephen Smith argue that the headcount measures ignore the inten-
sity of poverty and this incentivizes policymakers to focus their efforts on the 
least deprived segments of the poor, since it costs the least to help this group to 
cross over the poverty line. They contend that other conceptually robust meas-
ures are often dismissed from the policy discourse as being too complex and 
not intuitive. The 11 person equivalent headcount 11 measures they propose uses 
a monetary, benchmark measure of the average depth of poverty to count up 
the number of "person equivalent" poor. They calculate the person equivalent 
headcount for eighty countries using the World Bank's $1.25 per day poverty 
line, which shows a more rapid decline in global poverty and significant 
redistribution across regions and countries. 7 
In "Towards a Definition of Shared Prosperity: A Dynamic Perspective from 
Three Countries," Hai-Anh Dang and Peter Lanjouw present a complementary 
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measure to the shared prosperity measure employed by the World Bank which 
considers not only the currently poor, but incorporates the vulnerable popu-
lation, the segment of the population that is currently non-poor but face a 
heightened risk of falling back into poverty. Using illustrations from India, the 
United States and Vietnam for the mid- to Iate-2000s, they find that the two 
approaches are qualitatively consistent, with Vietnam enjoying the greatest 
boost in shared prosperity, followed by India and lastly, the United States. 
John Ifcher and Homa Zarghamee1s chapter on ((Evidence of the Compression 
of the Subjective Wellbeing Distribution with Economic Growth" looks at 
inequality from the subjective wellbeing perspective. To date, the existing lit-
erature has focused mainly on the mean of subjective wellbeing. The chapter 
expands the body of work to looking at inequality of subjective wellbeing, its 
changes and the relationship to growth. Using data from the World Values 
Survey and World Development Indicators, Ifcher and Zarghamee find that 
per capita income is inversely related to subjective wellbeing inequality in 
cross-sectional and time series (excluding the two fastest growing economies). 
The latter is an interesting corollary to the 11 Easterlin Paradox11 - that1 though 
as income increases, happiness increases, in the long run, increased income is 
not correlated with increased happiness. 
Karla Hoff broadens the inequality discourse by looking at social exclusion from 
the perspective of behavioral economics. In her paper1 11Behavioral Economics and 
Social Exclusion: Can Interventions Overcome Prejudice?" she demonstrates that 
mental models - intuitive, sodally learned sets of ideas about how things work -
can bias an individual's perceptions of himself and the world. She argues that 
government programs should attempt to look at both structural and behavioral 
factors in addressing social exclusion. Group deliberation changed perceptions 
and overcame biases in ways that led to the abandonment of female genital 
mutilation in many villages in Senegal. In the West Bengal state in India, political 
affirmative action for women improved the way men perceived women, parents 
perceived their daughters, and women perceived themselves. However, political 
affirmative action for low castes (the Scheduled Castes) appear to have had no 
impact on broadiy shared mental models. In the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, 
affirmative action for Scheduled Caste did not appear to change the perceptions 
that. the high-castes held of the Scheduled Castes and may have led to worse 
performance by high-caste teachers in public education, which Scheduled Castes 
unlike high castes disproportionately depend on. In India and China, expeti-
ments showed the impact of activating existing mental models, rather than of 
trying to change them. Making salient (by publicly revelation) the social identities 
of students in dominant and stigmatized social groups created a gap between their 
average performance, with the stigmatized groups performing significantly worse. 
The second volume1 Regions and Regularities, examines the state of global 
inequality and inequality in different regions; and analyzes other kinds of 
inequality and discrimination. 
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In the first chapter, 11The Inheritance of Employers and Nonlinearities in 
Intergenerational Earnings Mobility, 11 Miles Corak and Patrizio Piraino exam-
ine intergenerational earnings mobility by looking at the role of parents on a 
child's interface with the labor market using a rich data set from Canada. They 
show that this explains nonlinearities in the intergenerational transmission 
of earnings. Getting a job in the father's firm plays a major role in preserving 
wealth and income advantages across generations. 
In his chapter, "Do Nations Just Get the Inequality They Deserve?" Jose 
Gabriel Palma analyzes the contrasting centripetal and centrifugal forces at 
work within the distribution of income across countries. He argues that as 
a result of a process of convergence, the population located in the middle 
and Upper-middle (i.e., within deciles 5 to 9) tends to appropriate a share of 
about 50 percent of the national income. As a result, he proposes an alter-
native inequality measure to the Gini which is often referred to as the 11 Palma 
ratio". The Palma ratio defined as the ratio of the income share of the top 
10 percent over that of the bottom 40 percent, tries to capture inequality where 
it currently exists (the top and bottom of the income distribution). The chapter 
suggests that the huge diversity of distributional outcomes across the globe is 
not just the result of abstract economic forces, but rather the consequence of 
differences in economic structure and political settlements. 
The chapter by Nora Lustig, Luis Felipe Lopez-Calva and Eduardo Ortiz-
Juarez examines the state of inequality in the Latin America and the Caribbean 
region In 11 Deconstructing the Decline in Inequality in Latin America11 they 
show that inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and other indica-
tors (including all variations of the Kuznets ratio), declined in sixteen of the 
eighteen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the period 2000 
to 2012. They attribute the decline to the decrease in hourly labor income 
inequality and progressive government transfers. This is a study that clearly 
has lessons for other parts of the world and other economies at similar stages 
of development. 
The Arab countries are the focus of Radwan Shaban's chapter, "Inequality in 
Arab Countries." He observed a similar general declining trend in the Arab coun-
tries, in the period leading up to the Arab Spring. Furthermore, the median Gini 
coefficient for the Arab countries, at 36 percent, was lower compared to 38 percent 
for the world and 40 percent for all emerging market economies and develop-
ing countries. He concludes by offering some plausible explanations of the dif-
ference between the measurement of inequality from household surveys and 
the perceived inequality as evidenced by the increased demand for fairness and 
social justice in the Arab countries. 
In their chapter, James Galbraith, Beatrice Halbach, Aleksandra Malinowska, 
Amin Shams and Wenjie Zhang summarize a comprehensive revision and 
update of the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) work on the 
inequality of pay and incomes around the world for the period 1963-2008. 
Their new data set on industrial pay inequality (UTIP-UNIDO) based on 
the Industrial Statistics of the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization covers 4,054 observations for 167 countries, and the revised 
Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) database of gross household 
income inequality covers 3,871 observations for 149 countries. Their paper 
"The UTIP Global Inequality Data Sets 1963-2008: Updates, Revisions and 
Quality Checks" provides a fairly comprehensive quality check of the database 
against other available measures. They conclude that the EHII data set is reli-
able in estimating trends and reasonably reliable in estimating the level of gross 
income inequality observed in household surveys, but provides the advantage 
of dense and consistent coverage across the global economy, and is therefore 
useful for comparative and historical analyses. 
In "Inequality and the Fragility of Growth," Jonathan Ostry attempts to address 
two questions. To what extent does inequality render growth more fragile? And, if 
inequality makes growth less stable, what are the possible implications as far as 
redistributive policies are concerned? Ostry examh1es the relationship between 
the duration of growth spells and a number of determinants, including ine-
quality. He focuses on spells rather than standard panel growth regressions 
because growth, especially for developing countries, is not a smooth process, 
and drawing inferences from panel growth regressions in such circumstances 
may be misleading. He finds that more equal societies have more durable 
growth spells. He then asks the question whether redistributive policies should 
be used to bring about less fragile growth. Ostry finds that except in extreme 
casesi there is no trade-off between growth and redistribution - a marked 
departure from the perspective that was dominant until recently, but consist-
ent with the analysis of Stiglitz (2012) and other more recent studies. 
To what extent does inequality in the control over a society's resources 
facilitate or hinder growth? This is one of the key questions in the growth and 
inequality debate. However, empirical studies to date have tended to use the 
distribution of income as a proxy for distribution of wealth. In !(Does Wealth 
Distribution and the Source of Wealth Matter for Economic Growth? Inherited 
v. Uninherited Billionaire Wealth and Billionaires' Political Connections," 
Sutirtha Bagchi and Jan Svejnar attempt to answer the question posed by the 
title of their paper, using a derived global measure of wealth inequality from 
Forbes magazine's list of billionaire and decomposing wealth into three com-
ponents: wealth obtained through political connections (cronyism), wealth 
generated from entrepreneurship1 and inherited wealth. In their sample, 
inherited billionaires, the largest group account for about 54-72 percent of the 
total (depending on the year under consideration) and politically connected 
billionaires represent the smallest 4-13 percent of total billionaire wealth. They 
find that politically connected wealth and inherited wealth have a significant 
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negative effect on growth, while the effects on growth of wealth generated 
from entrepreneurship are insignificant. 
Ashwini Deshpande's chapter on "Caste Discrimination in Contemporary 
India" examines the state of caste disparities and discrimination in India, and 
notes how discrimination is very inuch a part of modern Indian society and 
also across the world with different kinds of systems, which seem to suggest 
that discrimination based on social identities is compatible with freely flJilc-
tioning markets. She finds that the persistence of caste inequalities results in 
both inequality of opportunities and inequality of outcomes. To rectify inter-
group discrimination, such as those based on caste, will require purposive 
multi-pronged interventions. 
The chapters are followed by interesting commentaries and in some cases1 
vigorous challenges by the discussants: Martin Ravallion, Bhaskar Dutta, 
Aristomene Varoudakis1 Sudhir Anand, Paola Giuliano, James Foster and 
Murray Leibbrandt in volume 1 and Francisco Ferreira, Joseph Stiglitz, Edward 
Wolff1 Francois Bourguignon, Kendra Bischoff1 Shantayanan Devar&jan, 
Celestin Monga, and William Darity, Jr. in volume 2. The work in these two 
volumes illustrates the complexity of the processes that determine the level of 
inequality in society and the importance of understanding them. The chapters 
have drawn attention to the many dimensions of inequality and the difficulties 
of measuring them, and the importance of both the inequality of outcomes 
and inequality of opportunity. The chapters have shown that inequalities, both 
in income and opportunity, can be affected by policy; and that policies that 
reduce these inequalities tend to promote development and enhance growth. 
Some of the subjects addressed in this book have long been neglected. We 
see this two-volume monograph as opening up a debate, while being aware 
that there is much more to be said about each of the questions that have been 
addressed here. The aim of this volume is to put the discourse on a more sound 
scientific footing by marshalling some of the leading experts to contribute to 
our understanding of the main patterns of, and interconnections between, 
inequality and growth, and to nudge us towards the design of more effective 
policies for creating a better and a more inclusive global economy. 
Notes 
L The authors would like to thank Karla Hoff for her extensive comments. 
2. The twin goals were adopted by the World Bank's Gove1uors at the Development 
Committee meeting on April 20, 2013. 
3. It is worth clarifying that prior to the newly enunciated goals, many in the World 
Bank had written and spoken about the excesses of inequality; what is new is the 
formal adoption of the 1nitigation of inequality as a goal. Some commentators argued 
L 
that the 11bottom 40 percent 11 focus is not an inequality measure because it does not 
speak comparatively with the rest of the income distribution. While this is technically 
true, since the overall growth rate of each economy is so widely knov.'11, making the 
data available for the growth of the bottom 40 percent immediately shows whether 
the poorest 40 percent is catching up or falling behind. Making this data available 
is a prompt to policymakers to curb the growth of inequality, to make sure that the 
bottom 40 percent grows faster than the top 60 percent. To say that this is not an 
inequality measure because we do not say what the policymakers should do with the 
new data is like saying that providing the Gini coefficient is not an aid to curbing 
inequality unless we make it explicit each time that the aim is to minimize the Gini 
and not maximize it. 
4. Here we overlook a number of complex statistical issues. If, as reflected in the emerg-
ing consensus, countries with lower inequality grow better and are more stable, and if 
(as is surely the case), lower inequality and greater stability are associated with lower 
poverty1 there are difficult problems of identification that are not addressed by most 
of the statistical studies: policies that led to poverty and inequality reduction may 
have led to higher growth. 
5. For those unfamiliar with purchasing power parity (PPP) numbers, we may point out 
that in most developing countries 1.25 dollars PPP-adjusted translates to 35 to 45 
cents. The fact that nearly one-seventh of the world lives below this line is a serious 
indictment of our effort at poverty mitigation thus far. 
6. Stiglitz's paper was planned as a standalone presentation for general discussion with-
out a designated discussant. 
7. Or $1.90 per day, which is the updated poverty line in 2011 based on new PPP data, 
but constant in real terms to $1.25 per day poverty line based on 2015 PPP data. 
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